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Why did prices in Japan hardly decline
during the 1997-98 recession?
Hideo Hayakawa and Hiroshi Ugai
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1. Introduction
Recently, the United States and European economies have been enjoying stable inflation together
with continuously diminishing output gaps. Presumably, most of the participants in this meeting will
discuss channels that suppress the rise in prices, such as the enhancement of productivity led by
information technology, especially in the United States, or changes in wage-setting behaviour. Turning
our eyes to Japan, however, we can find contrary developments in prices. The Japanese economy
was on the brink of a deflationary spiral in 1998 as the output gap expanded rapidly and the risk of
negative interaction between economic activity and financial stability mounted. But, in fact, prices did
not fall as much as would have been suggested by classical estimates of the output gap. The main
purpose of this paper is to try to find the factors behind these price developments in Japan.
Even if this puzzle is solved, there remains the question of whether information technology or other
technological innovations have had any impact on prices in Japan. Looking at the Japanese economy
recently, business fixed investment related to information technology has started to increase
substantially. In addition, recent changes in the distribution sector are said to be having some effect on
price developments in Japan. Taking these into consideration, we will examine how technological
innovation and other supply side structural changes have influenced Japan￿s price developments in
recent years and how these differ from experiences in other countries.
This paper tries to present hypothetical answers to the above questions by surveying price
developments in Japan in the 1990s and by studying recent effects of structural economic changes on
prices.
2
2. Characteristics of price developments in the 1990s
In this section, we review price developments during the 1990s. As regards relationships between
various price indices and economic developments in Japan during this period, prices basically moved
along with the supply-demand gap until 1997 (Figures 1 and 2).
In detail, 1990 was when the overheating of the economy was in its last phase as asset prices
skyrocketed. From 1991, the euphoria regarding future economic growth collapsed and capital stock
adjustment began. Additionally, the balance sheets of firms deteriorated along with the drop in asset
prices, and the Japanese economy faced a serious recession. At the beginning of this recession, the
deceleration of inflation rates remained moderate as wage adjustments were relatively slow, reflecting
a labour shortage among small to medium-sized companies. In these circumstances, consumer price
increases peaked at over 3% on a year-to-year basis in 1991. But thereafter, the CPI inflation rate
declined until 1993, and domestic wholesale prices dropped.
The economy then bottomed out at the end of 1993 and a moderate economic recovery continued
until the beginning of 1997. The money stock increased gradually. Prices basically moved in
accordance with the output gap, but there were some phases when prices moved in the opposite
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direction to developments in the gap. For instance, the rate of decline in domestic wholesale prices
accelerated during the economic expansion in 1996, when the real GDP growth rate reached 5.1%
and the yen depreciated significantly.
In fiscal 1997, Japan￿s economic growth turned to deceleration, reflecting efforts at fiscal consolidation
such as a rise in the consumption tax rate. At the same time, the financial and economic turmoil in
Asia started to have its negative effect on the Japanese economy through exports. Furthermore, the
disturbance in the financial system triggered by the failure of major financial institutions, including
Yamaichi Securities and Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in November 1997, induced a deterioration in
corporate and household sentiment as well as a stringent lending stance on the part of financial
institutions. The economy then underwent an unprecedented decline during 1998 as both private
consumption and business fixed investment fell. Hence, the output gap expanded significantly and
immense downward pressure was exerted on prices. Towards the end of 1998, the financial ratings of
large firms were lowered frequently, reflecting shrinking corporate profits and worsening balance
sheets in line with the economic slowdown. The lending stance of financial institutions became even
more cautious. In these circumstances, downward pressure on prices became stronger as the
negative link between the weakening of the real economy and the tightening of financial conditions
intensified.
From the autumn of 1997 to end-1998, economic deterioration increased the credit risks of firms and a
credit contraction occurred, as financial institutions became extremely restrictive about lending. This
accelerated the contraction in the real economy. Thus, in 1998, the nominal GDP growth rate dropped
to a record low since statistics were first compiled in 1955, and corporate profits were squeezed
(Figure  3). Since wage adjustments were slow relative to the contraction in output and prices,
corporate profits deteriorated further, and the burden created by the need to repay debts increased in
the real term. This led to a further drop in demand. It is usually assumed that the rigidity of nominal
wages will stop the fall in prices. In Japan, however, the decline in nominal wages started as a result
of efforts by firms to reduce costs (Figure 1). Thus, Japan was at that stage on the brink of a vicious
cycle between output and prices, the ￿deflationary spiral￿. Fortunately, the threat of a cumulative drop
in wages and prices did not turn into reality. Meanwhile, growth in the money stock was relatively
rapid, while nominal GDP declined substantially. It seems that further monetary easing and corporate
finance policies implemented by the Bank of Japan and the credit guarantee system introduced by the
government reduced the downward pressure on prices and kept the economy from a fully fledged
deflationary spiral.
From 1999, the disturbance in the financial market observed during 1998 started to become stable.
The implementation of the zero interest rate policy and the strong commitment to monetary easing by
the Bank of Japan, and easing anxieties over the stability of the financial system resulting from
injections of public funds into private banks, helped improve consumer and business sentiment and
thereby triggered economic recovery. During this process, downward pressure on consumer prices
also weakened. Growth in the money stock dropped slightly.
With respect to the price and economic developments described, the following three observations
emerge as puzzles to be solved.
First, why did prices hardly decline from 1998 to the beginning of 1999 during the economic
deterioration although the output gap was extremely large? Consumer prices, in particular, should
have declined significantly if they were moving along with the Phillips curve that would be estimated by
use of the output gap. Yet this relationship suddenly collapsed from 1998 (Figure 2). Even taking the
downward rigidity of the consumer price index into consideration, it cannot be explained fully why
prices did not decline.
3
Second, the growth rate of the money stock since 1997 has been paradoxical (Figure 4). The money
stock (M2+CDs) grew rapidly from the autumn of 1997 when the real economy underwent a serious
recession. On the other hand, money growth recently became sluggish after the economy started to
recover, suggesting a wild divergence between money and nominal GDP. Here, it is necessary to
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examine the developments in the money stock, especially from 1998 to the start of 1999, in relation to
the fact that the economy did not fall into a deflationary spiral.
Third, we need to consider reasons behind divergent developments in each of the price indices. For
instance, why did the rate of decline in domestic wholesale prices quicken during the economic
recovery in the mid-1990s? Moreover, it may be pointed out that the margin between CPI and WPI
inflation rates has significantly narrowed since the mid-1990s
4 (Figure 5). Therefore, it is necessary to
examine the relationship between prices and the supply side of the economy, such as technological
innovation, increases in imported products, deregulation and the streamlining of distribution channels.
The three puzzles are addressed below.
3. Relationship between the output gap and prices
During the 1997-98 recession, many supply-demand indices showed a substantial output gap
suggesting immense downward pressure on prices. But the decline in the consumer price index was
extremely moderate in comparison with the suggested deflationary pressures. This is the first puzzle to
be examined. There are two clues for this puzzle: first, stagnant domestic supply capacity in the face
of economic structural changes, and second; the mismatch in the labour market.
3.1 Measurement of the output gap and potential growth
The output gap captures supply-demand conditions from a macroeconomic perspective by measuring
the difference between potential GDP and real GDP. Although there are various estimation methods,
we use the following approach. First, we explain Japanese GDP by using a production function that
consists of three factors - labour, capital and total factor productivity (TFP). Then, we obtain the output
gap from the rate of difference between real GDP and potential GDP, which is the maximum GDP
obtained with labour and capital fully utilised.
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t Y : real GDP, t A : TFP,  t H : total working hours,  t L : number of workers,  : capital share,  t Om :
capacity utilisation rate in manufacturing industries,  t Km : capital stock of manufacturing industries,
t Oo : capacity utilisation rate in non-manufacturing industries,  t Ko : capital stock of non-manufacturing
industries.
Recently, the potential growth rate of Japan has been generally considered to be around 2%, and
thus, to diminish the output gap, economic growth should surpass this figure. Estimates of the output
gap often use only the capacity utilisation rate in manufacturing industries as a demand factor, while
ignoring rates in non-manufacturing industries. TFP, which explains the potential growth rate not
explainable by the growth in capital and labour, is usually assumed to grow constantly, reflecting
technological progress. Indeed, the output gap obtained by this method (thin solid line in Figure 6(1))
expanded in the first half of the 1990s and was temporarily reduced significantly from fiscal 1995 to
fiscal 1996.
5 Thereafter, it continued to expand until the end of fiscal 1999. If the output gap followed
such a trend, consumer prices should have declined until the end of 1999. Yet consumer prices did
not actually decline from 1998. The output gap also contradicts the supply-demand gap indicators
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based on firms￿ perceptions, such as the weighted average indicators (Supply and Demand Conditions
for Products DI, Production Capacity DI, and Employment Conditions DI in the Tankan-Short-term
economic survey of enterprises in Japan; Figure 6(2)) that have shown an upturn since the beginning
of 1999.
However, it should be noted that when this particular estimation of the output gap is used, large
measurement errors occur. In fact, if we estimate the production function by this method, the Solow
residual obtained by subtracting contributions of capital and labour from GDP has been significantly
reduced in recent years. As TFP is assumed to grow smoothly at a constant rate, residuals that cannot
be explained by the time trend in the Solow residual are included in components of the output gap
which are generated by demand fluctuations. This implies that estimated residuals are all supposed to
arise from the fluctuations in the capacity utilisation rate (especially that of non-manufacturers), which
cannot be captured statistically. Behind the expansion of the output gap obtained through this method,
estimated errors fluctuate largely at random and have been extremely large recently. However, it is
doubtful that the capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturers fluctuates a great deal in the short term.
In other words, these unrealistic movements of the output gap may be caused by the assumption that
TFP follows a linear time trend and the capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturing industries is
obtained as a residual.
If so, the problem generated by the estimation of TFP trend can be solved by changing the calculation
method of the output gap.
6 To do this, we have to estimate the capacity utilisation rate of
non-manufacturing industries that has been assumed for convenience to be 100%. Also removing the
assumption of the linear trend of TFP, we regard the Solow residual per se as the TFP (hereafter, we
call this ￿the output gap adjusted by the capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturers￿). The functional
form used for this is shown in Figure 7. As the capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturers cannot be
observed directly, the production capacity judgment BSI of non-manufacturers (Business Outlook
Survey of the Ministry of Finance) and the unit of electric power for business use (ratio of electricity
consumption for business use to electric power contracted for business use) are used to estimate the
rate indirectly. Here, we assume that the BSI captures developments in the capacity utilisation rate in
detail, while the unit of electric power for business use is employed to supplement the information at
the operating level. More concretely, parameters are estimated by regressing the unit of electric power
on the BSI and then the estimate obtained by substituting the BSI is considered to be the capacity
utilisation rate of non-manufacturing industries (Figure 8).
TFP calculated in this way fluctuates randomly instead of increasing at a constant rate. Intrinsically,
TFP is considered to be the mid- to long-run trend of technological progress and is affected by
changes in the quality of capital and labour, efficiency of resource allocation, regulation and
deregulation by the government, and social factors such as mobility of labour.
7
The rate of change in this new output gap (the thick solid line in Figure 6(1)) from its peak in 1990 to
the recent trough is smaller than that in the output gap calculated by the classical method. In addition,
the new output gap started to close from the beginning of 1999. This indicates that it is moving in
tandem with supply-demand indicators based on firms￿ perceptions (Figure 6(2)).
Next, to get a rough idea of the mechanism that determines prices in Japan, we estimate a Phillips
curve based on this output gap. In the estimate, a dependent variable is the inflation rate of consumer
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prices, and explaining variables are the output gap in the current quarter, the expected inflation rate
(proxied by the percentage changes in consumer prices in the previous quarter), and the supply shock
(proxied by the percentage changes in import prices in the current quarter). The estimation result was
essentially satisfactory (Figure 9) and the basic behaviour of the inflation rate can be explained by this
relationship.
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Estimation period: 1983 Q3-1999 Q4
t  : changes in the CPI (quarter-to-quarter trend cycle annualised, %)
t GAP : output gap
t WPIIM : changes in import prices (wholesale prices, yen basis, total average, quarter-to-quarter
percentage change, annualised, %)
This new estimation shows that the reason that the output gap hit bottom, although the economic
growth rate was low in fiscal 1999, was that TFP as a domestic supply factor reflects not only
technological progress but also short-term fluctuations caused by various factors. During the 1990s in
particular, the external environment changed, as is observed in the changes in industrial structure due
to the globalisation of the economy and the recent introduction of information technology (IT). In these
circumstances, it is likely that most of the capital stock, accumulated due to the vast business fixed
investment until around 1990, has become obsolete, although it still exists.
8 Furthermore, in the
process of these structural changes, an increasing number of firms require employees to obtain widely
applicable and highly technical skills instead of skills specific to an individual company. When workers
are not ready to satisfy this requirement, it is highly probable that labour productivity will decline. As
the economic value of capital and labour decreases, TFP in Japan and in turn overall capacity growth
seems to be lower than the potential growth rate calculated using the classical method, at least in the
short run.
9,10 From this perspective, the contraction of the output gap despite low economic growth
since 1999 can be explained.
As indicated, there are various problems surrounding the measurement and concept of the potential
growth rate and output gap. The output gap should only be used when explaining price development
trends and should not be expected to match short-term price fluctuations. Comparing the estimated
values of consumer prices obtained from the Phillips curve and actual consumer prices, however, the
estimated value dropped while the actual value increased somewhat at the end of 1998. Therefore, it
seems that this factor is not enough to explain why prices did not fall during this recession period.
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3.2 Expansion of the mismatch in the labour market
Among the relationships between various supply-demand gap indicators and prices, the divergence
between the unemployment rate and prices is the most conspicuous. This means that, especially in
the labour market, supply-demand conditions that influence prices cannot be measured just by the
unemployment rate. At present, the unemployment rate in Japan stands at 4.6% (as of August 2000),
remaining around the highest level since statistics were first compiled. There is a negative relationship
between the vacancy rate, which indicates insufficient employment, and the unemployment rate, which
shows excess employment (Beveridge curve; Figure 10(1)). From the 1970s, however, the curve has
repeatedly shifted to the right or right-upwards. Recently, the vacancy rate has increased slightly but
the unemployment rate remains at the highest recorded level. The right shift or the right-upward shift
of the relationship between the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate means that firms perceive
that excess employment persists, while others feel there is insufficient employment. It is highly
probable that some factors of a structural mismatch regarding labour supply and demand have
strengthened. This contrasts with the United States experience, where the relationship between the
two rates shifted left-downwards from the 1990s (Figure 10(2)). This growing mismatch in the labour
market is likely to cause a decline in the equilibrium level of the output gap.
11 In line with the expansion
of the output gap during 1998 to 1999, the equilibrium level declined. Thus, it is likely that deflationary
pressures were not exerted on the economy, as shown in the gap expansion.
To distinguish the number of workers unemployed as a result of business cycles from those whose
unemployment stems from structural factors, we have made four categories to explain
unemployment:
12 (1) macroeconomic activity shocks due to business cycles; (2) mismatch in labour
supply and demand reflecting age and sex among firms and industries (redistribution shock); (3)
exogenous changes in the labour force due to the enlarged female participation rate (labour force
shock); (4) hysteresis caused by the above factors and long-term changes in the labour force age
composition (for instance, when unemployment occurs due to economic recession, it has irreversible
effects on the economy, such as the loss of skills; deterministic trend). The result suggests that the
effects triggered by the economic recession have finally weakened from their worst level (Figure 11).
13
On the other hand, the long-term increasing trend of unemployed workers continues, since it takes
them a long time to find jobs due to lost labour skills, and the labour force age composition changes.
Furthermore, structural adjustments of industries and changes in ways of thinking about employment
among young generations seem to have increased the number of unemployed workers since 1995.
Recently in particular, firms have been taking globalisation and IT into account. Under these
conditions, firms have rapidly changed their stance towards their employees by requiring highly
technical skills that are widely applicable for many purposes. In this sense, the factors that cause the
stagnant capacity growth by deteriorating the value of the domestic labour force may simultaneously
create a supply-demand mismatch in the labour market.
There seem to have been structural changes in recent years in the relationship between the
unemployment rate and the change in wages (unit labour cost) (Figure 12(1)). The increase in the
number of unemployed workers from 1998 was apparently not only due to economic deterioration, but
also due to other structural factors. Hence, downward pressure on prices from 1998 to early 1999 was
not as strong as indicated by the increase in the unemployment rate or the expansion in the output
gap.
14
We have presented two hypotheses which should explain why consumer prices did not decrease as
much as predicted by the output gap from 1998 to early 1999. The argument is as follows: although
                                                     
11 The ￿equilibrium level￿ of the output gap refers to the level of the output gap which is analogous to the level of the natural
rate of unemployment in the labour market. This is expected to be lower than the level of potential GDP when the mismatch
in the labour market is resolved and capital is fully used.
12 See Nishizaki (2000) for details.
13 To break down the number of unemployed workers, we estimate reduced form VAR by standardising the Beveridge curve.
The impacts of the hysteresis are extracted. Furthermore, structural parameters are estimated on errors to identify the
macroeconomic activities shock, redistribution shock and labour force shock. For detailed examples on the United States,
see Blanchard and Diamond (1989).
14 In fact, there exists a negative correlation between unit labour cost and the unemployment rate based on shocks from
macroeconomic activities such as economic recovery and recession (Figure 12(2)).BIS Papers No 3 145
the output gap was large in 1998, it was smaller than calculated based on the medium- to long-term
potential growth rate usually imagined. Furthermore, downward pressure on prices moderated
somewhat as the equilibrium level also declined. All these factors were confirmed to keep the
Japanese economy from falling into a deflationary spiral.
4. Relationship between money stock and nominal GDP
To understand why the Japanese economy did not fall into a deflationary spiral from 1998 to 1999, we
need to examine the impact not only on the real side of the economy, but also on the financial side.
During this period, an unusual phenomenon seems to have occurred: the money stock continued to
grow at a high rate in contrast to nominal GDP. In fact, the relationships among the money stock
(M2+CDs), the economy (real GDP), and prices (GDP deflator) show that in 1998, the actual growth
rates of the money stock always exceeded their forecast values (Figure 13). This implies that some
missing variables that explained money demand played an important role in moving the money stock
during this period. This is the second puzzle to be solved.
The fully fledged deterioration of the Japanese economy in 1997 was largely prompted by the
disturbance in the financial system caused by the failures of large financial institutions in November
1997 (Sanyo Securities, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Yamaichi Securities, etc). As a result, concerns
about corporate financing increased rapidly and many risk premiums were added to interest rates for
fund-raising (Figure 14). This situation deteriorated further due to a drop in corporate profits from the
second half of 1998.
In these circumstances, an increasing number of firms and households not only refrained from
spending to secure liquidity, but also increased precautionary fund-raising.
15 It is highly likely that the
latter caused the rise in the money. In fact, the money stock continued to grow and the Marshallian k
(M2+CDs/nominal GDP) increased. Moreover, there was a possibility that if financial institutions could
not supply sufficient liquidity, firms might have tried to obtain liquidity even by selling products and
inventories, which was indeed seen in some Asian countries during the crisis period. In other words,
although the relationship between money and the economy is normally loose, the interaction between
lack of liquidity and price decline could become distinct when demand for liquidity increases drastically
as seen during this period.
After all, a deflationary spiral did not materialise as various monetary measures or policies adopted by
the Bank of Japan and the government wiped out corporate and household anxieties over liquidity
during 1998 and 1999.
16 Since 1999, the growth of money stock has become rather slow as
precautionary demand for liquidity by firms and households has decreased.
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5. Relationship between changes on the supply side of the economy and
prices
The third issue to be addressed is how structural changes on the supply side such as technological
innovation, increasing import penetration, deregulation and the streamlining of distribution channels
affected prices throughout the 1990s. Here, it is interesting to observe that the relationship between
real growth and inflation, especially in terms of the GDP deflator, looks rather tenuous, suggesting the
importance of supply side developments (Figure 16).
5.1 Technological innovation
In the United States, there are discussions about the channel that suppresses the rise in prices due to
the enhancement of productivity led by IT, and whether the United Kingdom follows this trend.
17 In
Japan, however, stagnant business fixed investment throughout the 1990s led to a decrease in
capacity growth, and as mentioned above, capacity growth recently seems to have been sluggish, at
least in the short term. From these facts, it is thought that at present, the downward pressure on prices
resulting from technological innovation is not accelerating.
However, the impact of the enhancement of productivity on the manufacturers￿ side, mainly in
electronics equipment, is clearly seen in price indices. For instance, the domestic wholesale price
index has been on a decreasing trend, even during the economic expansion phases of the 1980s and
1990s, except for the so-called bubble economy era in the second half of the 1980s. This is because
electronics machinery-related technological innovation has exerted downward pressure on domestic
wholesale prices through price declines in products such as semiconductors and personal computers.
To capture the degree to which the technological innovation factor pushes down domestic wholesale
prices, we calculate the contribution of items whose prices tend to be reduced with item-change,
reflecting technological innovation. The results are shown in Figure  17. As a whole, technological
innovation contributes to the decline in domestic wholesale prices or their final goods prices constantly
and rather firmly.
5.2 Industrialisation in Asian countries and the increase in reverse imports
One of the factors that influenced import prices in the 1990s was the appreciation of the yen. From
1993 and also from 1998 (Figure 18), prices of intermediate goods in wholesale prices decreased in
parallel with the appreciation of the yen, and after a while prices of final goods in wholesale prices
started to decline. Consumer prices of imported/import competitive goods
18 also decreased slightly
thereafter. Apart from intermediate goods, the pace of decline in final goods prices slowed, but prices
did not increase even though the yen depreciated as from the second half of 1995.
This is not only because the appreciation of the yen pushes down prices of imported/import
competitive goods, but also because a rapid expansion of inexpensive imported goods indirectly
pushes down the prices of import competitive goods (Figure 19). Behind this essentially lies the price
gap between Japan and Asian economies where personnel expenses and intermediate input costs are
much lower than in Japan. In addition to the appreciation of the yen in the 1990s, the progress of
industrialisation in Asian economies has significantly increased their supply capacity, resulting in a
massive inflow of inexpensive final goods into Japan. It is also noted that a shift in production from
Japan to Asia was a driving force for the industrialisation in Asian economies during the 1990s. Since
1993, the shift of production to Asia has become fully fledged. In the mid-1990s, an international
division of labour between Japan and Asia was established, in which parts of IT-related equipment
supplied by Japan were assembled in Asia to produce personal computers and audio equipment,
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which were then supplied globally. Inexpensive products were also reimported to Japan. The impact of
this trend on prices can be confirmed by looking at the list of CPI items where the contribution rates of
decline were the largest (top 50 items; Figure  20). The results show that the number of durable
consumer goods, such as audio and other electrical appliances, increased rapidly from 1995 to 1996,
and there were many items in apparel products in the first half of the 1990s.
5.3 Deregulation
Deregulation￿s downward pressure on prices has been observed from the beginning of the 1990s. For
instance, in 1991 restrictions on beef imports were abolished, and large-scale retailers started to open
new stores one after another with the deregulation of the Large-Scale Retail Store Law. Moreover, the
Foodstuff Control Law and Provisional Measures Law on the Importation of Specific Petroleum
Refined Products were abolished in 1995 and 1996 respectively. There appears to be a continuing
impact as a result of these deregulations. Looking at the list of CPI items whose prices are declining
fast (Figure  20), it is clear that petroleum products and rice have been constantly affected by
deregulation. In addition, the decrease in corporate service prices is influenced by declines in
communications fees and the damage insurance premium. In the immediate future, deregulation in
electricity charges and communications fees is expected to affect prices.
5.4 Streamlining of distribution channels
Streamlining of distribution channels means the reduction of distribution margins by cutting excess
profits or distribution costs, especially at the distribution stage. The streamlining of distribution
channels is typically visible in the rapid rise of inexpensive imported apparel products made in China in
the first half of the 1990s. The time when these Chinese products were imported rapidly roughly
matches the time when discount stores and roadside chain stores started to increase. This boom then
seemed to die down. However, since 1999 newly emerging retailing firms have improved both the
quality of goods by guiding manufacturing skills in China and the import techniques for a large amount
of inexpensive goods, aided by the appreciation of the yen. This movement has steadily taken root
and an increasing number of volume sellers are beginning to cut prices to compete with inexpensive
imported goods. These points are, once again, confirmed by looking at the list of CPI items whose
prices declined fast (Figure 20). The number of items in apparel products in the top 50 has gradually
increased since the end of 1998 after items such as suits and women￿s dresses obtained a majority in
the early 1990s. Recent activities of newly emerging retailing firms seem to have encouraged a
reorganisation in Japanese distribution industries, which have long been criticised for their inefficiency.
In fact, the ratio of sales in wholesaling to sales in retailing, and the ratio of total sales in wholesaling
to sales in wholesaling for retailing and final demand have continued to decrease from the beginning
of the 1990s (Figure 21).
Among the four points cited as supply side factors, factors 2 to 4, which became prominent in the
1990s, can be understood as part of the price level adjustment process through revisions of high
domestic prices and a narrowing of the price gap between Japan and abroad. It has been pointed out
that in Japan, the cost of living is high due to relatively high services prices and distribution costs,
while the prices of industrial products exposed to world competition are low. These corrections of high
prices did not progress very much until the first half of the 1990s, but thereafter the price gap has been
gradually reduced (Figure  22). This is because transactions aiming for arbitration of prices have
expanded, triggered by an expansion of the price gap between Japan and abroad due to the
appreciation of the yen, and by global business relationships in the world economy becoming
widespread. In recent years, the introduction of globally used business models that provide
inexpensive and high-quality products has exerted adjustment pressure on the price gap between
Japan and abroad. Furthermore, intensified global business relationships expand the range of tradable
goods and to some extent have arbitrage effects between Japan and abroad on services prices in the
form of deregulation.
This ￿globalisation of prices￿ eventually enhances both the economic efficiency and the purchasing
power of customers in the Japanese economy. Through this process, however, domestic demand
partly leaks overseas and profits of specific industries may be squeezed due to the decline in
competitive power and the narrowing of margins in existing conventional industries and wholesalers or
retailers protected by regulations. The fact that this process has deflationary effects in the short term
means that it must be carefully monitored.148 BIS Papers No 3
6. Concluding remarks
The output gap derived from the classical method does not separate supply factors successfully from
demand factors and thus fails to indicate actual supply-demand conditions. We tried to capture the
demand side more accurately by estimating the capacity utilisation rate in non-manufacturing
industries, and we re-estimated the output gap by measuring short-term capacity growth. We
discovered that the rate of change in the gap from its peak in 1990 to the recent trough is smaller and
the current output gap is closing gradually in line with the economic recovery that started in spring
1999, although it is still large, and its equilibrium level has been lowered.
However, it is still hard to calculate ￿the real output gap￿ as large measurement errors may exist,
especially in the current situation where there are structural changes in the Japanese economy. In
these circumstances, we should also examine in detail the current movements of price indices to find
the effects of supply side factors. Taking the output gap and the details of price indices into
consideration, our conclusion is that downward pressure on prices stemming from weak demand
seems to be declining significantly.
Needless to say, it is difficult to distinguish how much of the change in price levels comes from weak
demand and how much from the supply side. Furthermore, price declines may have a negative impact
on the economy in the short run, even though they do not come from weak demand, ie when they are
induced by the closing of the gap between domestic and foreign prices. In this situation, one way to
see whether the Japanese economy is under deflationary pressure is to examine the background of
price behaviour from the distributive side. Currently, corporate profits are increasing without a
decrease in the compensation of employees. This implies sustainability of the economic recovery
under moderately declining prices.
Recently, investment in IT has started to become active in the Japanese economy. If this investment
spreads throughout the economy and enhances total productivity, it will constrain price rises.
Nevertheless, at present there is no clear evidence that IT is stimulating total productivity, except for
enhancing productivity among IT manufacturers, especially that of the electronics machinery industry.
It will also take some time before the mismatch in the labour market disappears, but when it does this
too will enhance total efficiency in the economy. On the other hand, in the distribution sector, efforts to
enhance productivity have started to bear fruit. This phenomenon affects prices at the consumer level,
which means that consumer prices are likely to remain weak even amid economic recovery.BIS Papers No 3 149
Figure 1
Various price indices
Notes:  1. Adjustments for the effects of the consumption tax of April 1989 are made using the level-shift dummy of X-12-ARIMA, while those
for the effects of the consumption tax hike of April 1997 use the theoretical value on the assumption that prices of all taxable goods fully
reflect the rise in the tax rate. (However, the GDP deflator is adjusted using the level-shift dummy for both April 1989 and April 1997.)  2. Data
for 2000 Q3 CPI, Domestic WPI, and CSPI are from July.
Reference: Nominal wages (total amount of cash earnings)
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, Consumer Price Index; Bank of Japan, Wholesale Price Indexes; Economic Planning












85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Domestic wholesale price index














85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Total amount of cash earnings (at establishments with




Consumer price index (excluding perishables)150 BIS Papers No 3
Figure 2
Supply-demand gap and prices



























2. Output gap and inflation rate
CPI, sa quarterly percentage change
Output gap,%
Notes:    1.  Period: 1983 Q2-2000 Q1.    2.  Output gap = classical output gap obtained by fixing the capacity utilisation rate of
non-manufacturers (estimated by the Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan). CPI = General, excluding perishables
(adjusted for effects of consumption tax).
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Note: General CPI 1953-70 = excluding inputed rent; 1971-99 = excluding perishables (adjusted for effects of comsumption
tax).BIS Papers No 3 151
Figure 3
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National Income Statistics basis
Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by
Industry, Quarterly basis
3. Labour share
Notes:  1. Operating profits drawn from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly. Figures of the Financial
Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly are based on all industries of all sizes (excluding large firms in medical and
other services which include holding companies). Adjusted for discontinuity of data.    2.  From 1999 Q1, data for compensation of
employees are based on quarterly estimates.    3.  Labour share (from National Income Statistics) = compensation of employees/
(compensation of employees + operating profits) ￿ 100.    4.  Labour share (from Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by
Industry, Quarterly) = personnel expenses / (personnel expenses + current profits + interest expense paid + depreciation) ￿ 100.












Operating profits (left-hand scale)*
Compensation of employees
(right-hand scale)
2. Operating profits and compensation of employees
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Figure 4
Money stock, prices and GDP
1. M2 + CDs, nominal GDP







































80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
Logarithmic scale
00
3. Marshallian K (M2 + CDs/nominal GDP)
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, National Accounts; Bank of Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
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Figure 5
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CPI (goods) - WPI (corresponding to CPI)
00
Notes:    1.  WPI (corresponding to CPI) = items in the WPI that correspond to items included in CPI (goods) are
weighted averages based on CPI weights.  2.    Goods exclude perishables, electricity, gas and water charges and
petroleum products.  3.  Adjusted to exclude the effects of the consumption tax hike in April 1997.




Sources: Ministry of Finance, Business Outlook Survey of the Ministry of Finance; Economic Planning Agency, National
Accounts, Capital Stock of Private Enterprises, etc; The Federation of Electric Power Companies Japan, Electricity Demand;
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2. Supply-demand gap indications (from Short-Term Economic Survey of All Enterprises in Japan)BIS Papers No 3 155
Figure 7
Estimation method for output gap
(Revised capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturers)
1. Estimation of total factor productivity (TFP)
(1) Assume the Cobb-Douglas production function
  ) Ko Oo Km Om ( ) L H ( A Y 1 t t 1 t t
1
t t t t  
       
(2) Calculation of TFP
Obtain TFP (At) by taking the logarithm on both sides of the equation and then subtracting the
contribution of capital and labour from GDP
) ln( ) ln( ) 1 ( ln ln 1 1             t t t t t t t t Ko Oo Km Om L H Y A  
2. Calculation of potential GDP
Potential GDP = GDP produced using both maximised capital and labour. Then, substitute the
maximum input amount of each production factor of capital and labour into the production function
calculated in 1.
  ) Ko max Oo Km max Om ( ) max L max H ( A QN 1 t t 1 t t
1
t t t t  
       
3. Calculation of the output gap
Calculate the output gap using the rate of divergence between GDP and potential GDP.






Yt. real GDP, At: TFP, Ht: total hours worked, Lt: number of
workers employed,
: capital share ratio, Omt: capacity utilisation rate
(manufacturing),
Kmt: capital stock (manufacturing), Oot: capacity utilisation rate
(non-manufacturing),
Kot: capital stock (non-manufacturing)
QNt: potential GDP, At: TFP, Hmaxt: maximum total hours worked,
Lmaxt: maximum number of workers employed, : capital share ratio,
Ommaxt: historical maximum value of capacity utilisation rate
(manufacturing),
Kmt: capital stock (manufacturing),
Oomaxt: historical maximum value of capacity utilisation rate (non-
manufacturing),
Kot: capital stock (non-manufacturing)156 BIS Papers No 3
Figure 8
Capacity utilisation rate (output gap estimation)
Note: Capacity utilisation rate: historical maximum value = 100.
Estimation method for capacity utilisation rate (non-manufacturing)
1. Regress commercial power unit on BSI and make it level using the parameter.
(Estimation)
Commercial power unit = 487.3 + 2.10 ￿ Trend + 4.72 ￿
  BSI + ε
(130.3) (24.7) (11.1)
Estimation period : 1983 Q2-1999 Q4, Adj-R
2: 0.90, D W ratio: 0.58
Unit of electric power for business use:
commercial unit = commercial electricity consumption/commercial power contracts.
Trend: linear trend during the estimation period.
2. From the estimation result, the capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturers is obtained by:
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Year

















Capacity utilisation rate (left-hand
scale)




Percentage ￿insufficient￿ - ￿excess￿, percentage points
1. Capacity utilisation rate of manufacturers
2. Capacity utilisation rate of non-manufacturersBIS Papers No 3 157
Figure 9
Estimation of the Phillips curve using the output gap
Estimation
Estimation period: 1983 Q3-1999 Q4
 quarter-to-quarter trend cycle of the CPI (annualised)
GAPt: output gap (revised version incorporating the capacity utilisation rate of
non-manufacturers)





1.172 0.672 0.143 0.010 0.801 0.596
(3.89) (8.19) (3.52) (3.38)
Note: figures in brackets are t-values.
Sources: Economic Planning Agency, National Accounts, Gross Capital Stock of Private Enterprises, etc;
Management and Coordination Agency, Consumer Price Index; Bank of Japan, Wholesale Price Indexes.
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Figure 10
Beveridge curve
Notes:  1. Period: 1970 Q1-2000 Q1.  2. Vacancy rate = 100 ￿ (number of job offers - number of placements)/(number
of job offers - number of placements + number of workers employed).
Notes:  1. Period: CY1970-CY1998.  2. Unemployment rate is the ￿standardised unemployment rate￿ (compiled by the
OECD).
Reference: Beveridge curve
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, Labour Force Survey; Ministry of Labour, Report on Employment
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Figure 11
Breakdown of changes in the number of unemployed workers
1. Standardised number of unemployed workers and the trend
2. Breakdown of divergence of unemployed workers from the trend
Notes:    1.  In order to simplify the analysis, the numbers of unemployed workers, employed workers and vacancies are
standardised by dividing them by the sample average and taking the natural logarithm.  2. The breakdown method is: (1) the
reduced form VAR of the standardised numbers of unemployed workers, vacancies, and employed workers using the method in
note 1 is estimated. The answer obtained is the deterministic trend (long-run hysteresis) reflecting ageing and the transformation
of the industrial structure. (2) The random shock to the labour market is divided into three types: shocks from macroeconomic
activities<negative correlation between the number of unemployed workers and the number of vacancies>; shocks from
redistribution<positive correlation between the number of unemployed workers and the number of vacancies>; shocks from the
labour force<number of unemployed workers changes but the number of vacancies is unchanged>. By using the divergence
(residual) from the trend obtained in (1), the following two constraints are added: ￿each shock satisfies the characteristics in the
square brackets and does not correlate with the others￿, and ￿the unemployment rate and the vacancy rate both move in the
same direction as the redistribution shock for at least nine months￿. Then each shock is broken down. (3) Assume each shock is
0 and obtain the divergence between the actual value and the value calculated from the assumption. The divergence gap is the
contribution to each shock.
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, Labor Force Survey; Ministry of Labour, Report on Employment Service;
Nishizaki (2000) ￿Waga kuni no bebarijji kyokusen ni tsuite  (The Beveridge Curve in Japan)￿; Research and Statistics
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Figure 12
Relationship between unemployment rate and wages (unit labour cost)
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2. Relationship between unemployment rate and unit labour cost due to shocks from macroeconomic
activities
Notes:    1.  Unit labour cost = compensation of employees/real GDP.    2.  Unemployment rate due to shocks from macroeconomic
activities = number of unemployed workers due to shocks from macroeconomic activities/number of employed workers due to shocks
from macroeconomic activities.  3. The numbers of unemployed workers and employed workers due to shocks from macroeconomic
activities are calculated by using the method in note 2 of Figure 11 and converting the contribution to macroeconomic activities into the
number of people.  4. Period: 1983 Q1-1999 Q3.
Sources: Management and Coordination Agency, Labor Force Survey, Ministry of Labour, Report on Employment Service; Economic
Planning Agency, National Income Statistics; Nishizaki (2000) ￿Waga kuni no bebarijji kyokusen ni tsuite (The Beveridge Curve in
Japan), Research and Statistics Department, Bank of Japan, Working Paper Series, forthcoming.BIS Papers No 3 161
Figure 13
Projections on money using a five-variables VECM
Note: the five variables are nominal money (M2 + CDs), real GDP, GDP deflator, real stock prices (deflate Tokyo Stock
Price Index by GDP deflator), real long-term government bond yield (10-year). Using this five-variable VECM (sample
period: 1972 Q1-1996 Q4), and results obtained from the extrapolation estimation (1997 Q1-2000 Q1), the changes in
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Figure 14
Short-term money market and anxiety over fund management
1. Interest rate on term instruments
2. Spread of euro-yen interest rate and TB rate
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Sources: Bank of Japan, Tankan Short-Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan; Japanese Bankers Association;
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Figure 15
CP operations and credit guarantees
1. Amount outstanding of commercial paper
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Guarantee obligations outstanding (left-hand scale)





Note: Figures are those of client financial institutions of the Bank of Japan. Excludes those issued by banks.
Sources: National Federation of Credit Guarantee Corporations, Activities of Credit Guarantee Corporations; Bank of
Japan, Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly.
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Figure 16
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Figure 17
Wholesale price index (technological innovation factor)
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domestic WPI, final goods
Calculation method:    (1)  From the domestic WPI, items are chosen of which price fluctuations are mainly due to adjustments reflecting the
enhancement of the quality of the item at the time the item is changed (production cost method or hedonic regression approach). There are
72 items on the 1995 base and the weight is 164.3 (1/1000). Most of the items chosen are machinery-related items. For items prior to 1994 on the
previous base, similar items are chosen from the 1995 base.  (2) The overall fluctuation is calculated from the weighted average of the fluctuation
in each chosen item. Then the figure converted into an index (1995=100) is defined as the technological innovation factor index.  (3) Supply-
demand/import factor index = domestic WPI - technological innovation factor index.    (4)  Final goods of domestic WPI (69 items, weight
126.3<1/1000>) are also calculated using the same method.
Note: Domestic WPI is based on the total average (excluding the effects of seasonal changes in electricity rates). Adjusted for effects of the
consumption tax.
Source: Bank of Japan, Wholesale Price Indexes.
2. Breakdown of fluctuations in the wholesale price index
3. Breakdown of fluctuations in final goods of the wholesale price index
Year
Year
Year-in-year percentage change166 BIS Papers No 3
Figure 18
Comparison of prices
































Jan 1998 = 100
Intermediate goods (WPI)
Final goods (WPI)
Imported and import competitive goods (CPI)
Goods (excluding imported and import competitive goods; CPI)
Exchange rate (right-hand scale)
Notes:  1. The effects of the consumption tax are adjusted for both the WPI and the CPI. Data for the CPI are seasonally
adjusted. 2. Imported and import competitive goods (CPI) are goods which are defined as ￿imports￿ by the Management and
Coordination Agency, or are chosen by comparing them to items of imported goods (WPI) and by using microinformation.
Perishables, electricity, gas, water charges and petroleum products are excluded. Adjustment has been made for the increase in
the tobacco tax from December 1998. ￿Goods (excluding imported and import competitive goods; CPI)￿ are goods that are not
included in the above definition. These definitions are also used in the analyses hereafter.
Sources : Management and Coordination Agency, Consumer Price Index ; Bank of Japan, Wholesale Price Indexes.
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Figure 19
Import penetration ratio
Notes:  1. Import penetration ratio = imports/(shipments to the domestic market + imports).  2. Shares of each type of goods
are shown in angle brackets.
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Figure 20
CPI (declining rate of top items)
1. Breakdown of the top 50 items (declining rate)
2. Top 30 items (declining rate)
Notes:  1. The year-to-year percentage change as of December each year (figures for March 2000 are compared to the previous March) in
each item is calculated and the top 50 items with large negative contribution rates are chosen. The above Figure shows the number of items
included in the top 50 items while the bottom Figure indicates the names of the top 30 declining items.  2. The following goods are indicated
as: ￿clothes￿, shaded; ￿durable￿, bold, ￿imported/import competitive goods￿, italics.    3.  Deregulation-related items are petroleum products
(Provisional Measures Law on the Importation of Specific Petroleum Refined Products, abolished in April 1996) and rice (Staple Food Control
Act, abolished in November 1995).
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1 Monthly magazines,
women’s
Rice A (domestic) Gasoline (regular) Gasoline (regular) Gasoline (regular) Gasoline (regular) Rice A (domestic)
2 Beef (imported) TV sets Word processors TV sets Rice A (domestic) Kerosene TV sets
3 Gasoline (regular) Gasoline (regular) TV sets Word processors Word processors Gasoline (premium) Beef (imported)
4 Room airconditioners Beef (imported) Rice A (domestic) Computer games Clean water equipment ￿Kabayaki￿, broiled eels Women’s overcoats
5 Hen eggs Standard rice Video tape recorders Tyres Gasoline (premium) Room air conditioners Chrysanthemums
6 Word processors Room air conditioners Car wax Room air conditioners Rice B (domestic) Word processors ￿Kabayaki￿, broiled eels
7 Women’s overcoats Rice B (domestic) Kerosene Gasoline (premium) Telephone set Women’s overcoats Refrigerators
8 Refrigerators Refrigerators Refrigerators Video tape recorders Hen eggs Refrigerators Handbags
9 TV sets Men’s suits (for winter) Pants for exercise Refrigerators Kerosene Car wax Carnations
10 Kerosene Video tape recorders Rice B (domestic) Detergent, laundry TV sets Washing machines (full
automatic type)
Electric rice-cookers
11 Men’s suits (for winter) Kerosene Detergent, laundry Electric rice-cookers Video tape recorders Bathtubs Flowerpots
12 Video tape recorders Glutinous rice Salted salmon Instant coffee Detergent, laundry Women’s suits (for winter) Computer games
13 Salted salmon Bath preparation
Women’s suits (for spring
& autumn) Telephone set Whisky A Dog foods Men’s suits (for summer)
14
Women’s slacks (for
winter) Men’s suits (for summer) Chrysanthemums Car wax Refrigerators Sausages Video tape recorders












Women’s suits (for spring &
autumn)
Tape recorders Women’s overcoats
Washing machines (full
automatic type)
Fried food Men’s three-season coats
18 Quilts Blended rice (domestic) Handbags Tape recorders Blended rice (domestic) Handbags Coffee cups & saucers
19 Men’s jackets Detergent, laundry Face cream Video cameras Chrysanthemums Tyres Beer
20 Sausages Salted cod roe Yogurt Quilts Microwave ovens Electric shavers Men’s sweaters
21 Tape recorders Cameras ￿Gyoza￿ Washing machines (full
automatic type) Disposable diapers Detergent, laundry
One-piece dresses (for
summer)
22 Men’s suits (for summer) Salted salmon Frozen croquettes Dolls Bath preparation Disposable diapers Beef (shoulder)
23 Cream puffs Word processors Mayonnaise Salted cod roe Whisky C Fluorescent lamp fittings
Women’s sweaters (short
sleeves)
24 Bicycles Tape recorders Ice cream Clean water equipment Electric rice-cookers 100% fruit drinks Clean water equipment
25 Carpets Video cameras Bathtubs Fresh milk (sold in stores) Facial tissue Rings Disposable diapers
26 Detergent, laundry ￿Mochi￿, rice-cakes Quilts Carpets Computer games Tape recorders Pickled chinese cabbage
27 Fresh milk (sold instores) Rolled toilet paper Kerosene stoves Vacuum cleaners Whisky B Bean-jam buns Fishes in soybean paste
28 Facial tissue Fresh milk (sold in stores) Knitted suits Cameras Tyres Video tape recorders Quilts
29
Women’s suits (for
winter) Men’s sweaters Electric rice-cookers Facial tissue Video cameras Salted cod roe
￿Shirasu-boshi￿, dried
young sardines
30 Dog foods Facial tissue
Automobiles (661cc-
1500cc)
Liquid detergent, kitchen Foundation Cameras Pork (shoulder)BIS Papers No 3 169
Figure 21
Streamlining of distribution channels
<Calculation method>
W sales (wholesale industry)
R sales (retail industry)
ratio of the retail industry to the wholesale industry
W total amount of sales (wholesale industry) ￿ inter-office transactions                             
W sales to retailers + sales to industries other + sales to overseas + sales to consumers
than wholesale and retail
= sales of wholesale industry/sales of wholesale industry to users
Presence of primary and secondary wholesalers within the wholesale industry.
Notes:  1. Data for sales are seasonally adjusted. These figures have been adjusted for discontinuity of data based on firms
of all scales in the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly.    2.  Total amount of sales
(wholesale industry) based on data in the Census of Commerce.
Sources: Ministry of Finance, Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly; Ministry of International
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Figure 22
Gap between domestic and foreign prices
1. Changes in price gaps between Japan and overseas; living expenses
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Note: Price gaps between Japan and overseas for final goods are based on the Shuyona shohizai oyobi sabisu ni kakaru naigai kakakusa chousa
kekka (1999 nen) ni tsuite (Economic Planning Agency; see source). Each component is weighted by using the weight of the CPI of Japan (for
￿television￿, 1998 figures are used). The breakdown of each component is as follows: clothes and footwear: mens’ suits (for winter), mens’ slacks
(for winter), skirts (for winter), mens’ business shirts, mens’ briefs, mens’ shoes (leather). Foods: rice, white bread, spaghetti, salmon, fresh milk,
hens’ eggs, onions, oranges, bananas, sugar, black tea, cola drinks, beer. Household electric appliances: television, video tape recorders. Other
goods: facial tissues, gasoline, films, magazines, newspapers, lipsticks, compact discs.
Source: Economic Planning Agency, Shuyona shohizai oyobi sabisu ni kakaru naigai kakakusa chousa kekka (1999 nen) ni tsuite (Survey Results
on the Price Gap of Major Consumer Goods and Services between Japan and Overseas <1999>), Seikeihi chousa ni yoru koubairyoku heika
oyobi naigaikakakusa no gaikyo (Summary Report on Purchasing Power Parity and Price Gaps between Japan and Overseas According to the
Living Expense Survey); Management and Coordination Agency, Consumer Price Index.
(i) Clothes and footwear (ii) Household electric appliances
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